In Cybersecurity we have a saying; Hackers don’t hack their way in, they simply log in. This is so true in this case.
Federal prosecutors have indicted three engineers accused of stealing processor security and cryptography trade secrets from Google and allegedly transferring sensitive data to unauthorized locations, including Iran.
From a security lens, based on the indictment, what actually happened is that the alleged activity followed a familiar but dangerous pattern:
- Legitimate employment provided trusted access
- Sensitive files were moved to third party communication channels
- Data was copied to personal devices
- Affidavits were allegedly used to create false assurance
- Screens were manually photographed to evade DLP controls
- Activity continued even after access revocation
If proven, this was not smash and grab. It was patient, iterative, and adaptive. In other words, it looked like a modern insider campaign.
While the case is still unfolding, the alleged behavior shows characteristics consistent with advanced persistent threat (APT) tradecraft:
- Abuse of legitimate credentials
- Quiet exfiltration over time,
- Cross channel data movement
- Deliberate steps to avoid monitoring
- Human-in-the-loop bypass techniques
Most organizations still focus heavily on external attackers. Insider exfiltration works because it takes advantage of what every company must allow employees to do: collaborate, move quickly, and be productive. Three gaps show up in almost every environment:
- Over trust in identity once authenticated
- Weak behavioral baselining
- Blind spots around analog exfiltration
In today’s geopolitical climate, especially as the USA prepares to attack Iran, any unexplained movement of advanced semiconductor or cryptographic IP should be treated as strategically significant.
If an organization with Google’s security maturity can face this kind of insider risk, every enterprise should pay attention.
Security leaders should be asking right now:
- Do we monitor behavior after login?
- Can we detect abnormal data movement across collaboration tools?
- Are we modeling screenshot and photo exfiltration?
- Is our insider risk program real or just compliance checklist?
Trust is necessary but verification must be continuous in each and every step along the way. Just remember, the attacker may already have a badge.
